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The Means and Ends of Wellness Programs
Abstract
How far should we go in assigning individuals causal responsibility for their own health status and what
should the implications of any such assignment be?
Few would deny that most adults have a major role in achieving and maintaining their own health.
However, it is not at all clear where one should draw the line between what is freely chosen and what is
determined by forces outside a person’s control. Medical care plays only a small role in most people’s
overall health, and often social, environmental, and personal factors are far more important. Incentivizing
an individual to take better care of her health by adding incentives or penalties to her health coverage,
even if done as reasonably as possible, may be far less effective than altering key social and
environmental factors that are strongly linked to health status.
Altering health coverage to include wellness incentives in an effort to manipulate individual behavior is a
problematic trend. On the one hand, including such incentives ostensibly furthers the principle of
distributive justice by encouraging individuals to take more responsibility for their health. But, on the other
hand, such incentives not only misconstrue the purpose of coverage, but also arguably create an injustice
by inappropriately elevating individual responsibility for health while ignoring the larger, systemic
contributors to chronic diseases and conditions. Consequently, this injustice is harmful to all of us.
Making access to health coverage contingent on health improvement efforts decreases access to health
care services by making it more difficult or costly for individuals to obtain, retain, and use coverage, and
inappropriately and disproportionately burdens the more vulnerable, without outweighing benefits. This
practice focuses attention away from the larger causes of the problems, while blaming individuals for
matters that are not completely within their control.
This article will examine these issues as they manifest in private and public coverage in the form of
employer-sponsored wellness programs and Medicaid personal responsibility requirements. Part I will
examine the history and increasing devolution of responsibility for health onto individuals through
changes in employer-sponsored wellness programs and personal responsibility requirements in Medicaid
programs. Part II will examine ethical considerations regarding these changes. The article will conclude
by showing that the degree to which we currently allocate responsibility for health onto individual
behavior versus the government is ethically problematic and likely to lead to poor societal and financial
outcomes. Individual choice has a role to play, but only in concert with collective legal action on larger
policy issues.
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THE MEANS AND ENDS OF
WELLNESS PROGRAMS
BY: LAURA D. HERMER, J.D. LL.M.*
How far should we go in assigning individuals causal responsibility for
their own health status and what should the implications of any such assignment
be? After all, it seems intuitive that each of us is best positioned to maintain our
own health, best understands the consequences of not doing so, and should
therefore be held accountable for it. Yet, as Professor Daniel Wikler observed
many years ago, the merits of these assumptions are far from clear.1 It may be,
he warned, “that the lack of a debate over the merits of assigning responsibility
for health to the individual will lead to the uncritical and unhesitating adoption
of the associated political and moral program.”2
Thirty years later, we are seeing the fruit of this gradual and piecemeal
adoption ripple through the sphere of health policy and into people’s everyday
lives. Grocery shoppers and chain restaurant customers can choose to purchase
reduced-calorie, gluten-free, or other “healthy” products. Consumers can buy
devices or apps allowing them to track heart rate, personal sleep cycles, steps
taken, etc.3 Smokers can choose a variety of implements intended to help them
quit, from nicotine patches to vaping devices.4 Employers offer managed care
plans and virtual primary care services, increase deductibles and cost-sharing
amounts to shift health care expenses to employees, and institute programs
intended to encourage improved employee wellness, among other changes.5
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journal for their work and assistance.
1. See Daniel Wikler, Who Should Be Blamed for Being Sick?, 14 HEALTH EDUC. Q. 11 (1987),
reprinted in PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS: THEORY, POLICY, PRACTICE 89 (Ronald Bayer, Lawrence O.
Gostin, Bruce Jennings et al., eds. 2007).
2. Id. at 95.
3. See, e.g., Christian de Looper, The 10 Best Healthcare Apps, DIGITAL TRENDS (2019),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/best-health-apps/ (detailing features of particular fitness, diet, and
other health apps available).
4. Want to Quit Smoking? FDA-Approved Products Can Help, FDA (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/want-quit-smoking-fda-approved-products-can-help
(outlining available products to assist with such as nicotine replacement therapies and prescription
smoking cessation medicines).
5. See infra, Part II.A.
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Additionally, most states have embraced managed care plans in Medicaid for all
but the frailest populations.6 Other states have sought with varying degrees of
success to institute personal responsibility provisions to reward or punish healthrelated or other behaviors exhibited by Medicaid beneficiaries.7
Few would deny that most adults have a major role in achieving and
maintaining their own health. However, it is not at all clear where one should
draw the line between what is freely chosen and what is determined by forces
outside a person’s control. For example, in some cases the financial ability to
obtain or retain health insurance has become tied not just to financial factors, but
to personal improvement efforts.8 An uncritical and outsized notion of the
responsibility individuals have for their health underlies this trend. While health
coverage can make it financially possible for people to access health care,
coverage is not about improving health per se. Medical care plays only a small
role in most people’s overall health, and often9 social, environmental, and
personal factors are far more important.10 Incentivizing an individual to take
better care of her health by adding incentives or penalties to her health coverage,
even if done as reasonably as possible, may be far less effective than altering key
social and environmental factors that are strongly linked to health status.11
Altering health coverage to include wellness incentives in an effort to
manipulate individual behavior is a problematic trend. On the one hand,
including such incentives ostensibly furthers the principle of distributive justice
by encouraging individuals to take more responsibility for their health. But, on
the other hand, such incentives not only misconstrue the purpose of coverage,
but also arguably create an injustice by inappropriately elevating individual

6. See, e.g., State Health Facts, Medicaid Managed Care Penetration Rates by Eligibility Group,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/managed-care-penetration
rates-by-eligibilitygroup/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%
22%7D (showing that, in at least some states with substantial Medicaid managed care penetration, a
smaller percentage of aged and disabled beneficiaries are enrolled in managed care than other Medicaid
populations).
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., J. Michael McGinnis, Pamela Williams-Russo, and James R. Knickman, The Case
For More Active Policy Attention To Health Promotion, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 78, 83 (2002) (stating that,
“[o]ver the course of the twentieth century, about five of the thirty years of increased life expectancy
could be attributable to better medical care”).
10. See, e.g., Tiffany Fitzpatrick, Laura C. Rosella, Andrew Calzavara et al., Looking Beyond
Education and Income: Socioeconomic Status Gradients Among Future High Cost Users of Health
Care, 49 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 161, 163 (2015) (“In the unadjusted models …, [high cost users]
were most strongly associated with low income and low household education. Strong gradients of
association were noted for lower household income, higher area dependency, and lower ethnic
concentration. After adjusting for age, these associations were attenuated, with the exception of home
ownership and food security, which were strengthened…”).
11. See infra Part III.
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responsibility for health while ignoring the larger, systemic contributors to
chronic diseases and conditions. Consequently, this injustice is harmful to all of
us. Making access to health coverage contingent on health improvement efforts
decreases access to health care services by making it more difficult or costly for
individuals to obtain, retain, and use coverage, and inappropriately and
disproportionately burdens the more vulnerable, without outweighing benefits.12
This practice focuses attention away from the larger causes of the problems,
while blaming individuals for matters that are not completely within their
control.
This article will examine these issues as they manifest in private and public
coverage in the form of employer-sponsored wellness programs and Medicaid
personal responsibility requirements.13 Part I will examine the history and
increasing devolution of responsibility for health onto individuals through
changes in employer-sponsored wellness programs and personal responsibility
requirements in Medicaid programs.14 Part II will examine ethical considerations
regarding these changes.15 The article will conclude by showing that the degree
to which we currently allocate responsibility for health onto individual behavior
versus the government is ethically problematic and likely to lead to poor societal
and financial outcomes. Individual choice has a role to play, but only in concert
with collective legal action on larger policy issues.16
PART I: CONTEXTUALIZING WORKPLACE WELLNESS PLANS AND MEDICAID
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
The focus on personal responsibility for health in the context of health
coverage predates the George W. Bush administration, but it sharpened during
that presidency. When Bush first took office, he faced complementary problems
with respect to health coverage. On the one hand, a growing percentage of
Americans lacked health insurance,17 while at the same time health care costs
and health coverage costs were rising.18 Neither President Bush nor the 107th and
108th Congresses were inclined to address either issue through large, government

12. See infra, notes 76–81, 108-111 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. ROBERT J. MILLS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, P60-215, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2000
(2001), http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2001/demographics/p60-215.pdfplp.
18. See Sherry Glied, Health Care Costs: On the Rise Again, 17 THE J. OF ECON. PERSP. 125
(2003).
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solutions. Instead the administration focused on limited solutions that made use
of the private market.19
A number of strategies were employed to address the issue of rising health
care costs, but one in particular became important for our purposes here: wellness
programs. These are “program[s] of health promotion or disease prevention” that
meet specific statutory requirements in an effort to make individuals healthier
and, in the process, help keep down health care costs.20 Wellness programs
generally must be devised to help individuals become or stay healthy.21 They
may involve measures such as subsidized gym memberships, biometric
screenings, health risk assessments, or structured programs to help people lose
weight, exercise more, or stop smoking.22 The benefit of participation need not
take the form of a reward, but may instead be the “absence of a surcharge.”23
This strategy permits the entity providing coverage to charge more money to
individuals who refuse to participate in particular kinds of wellness programs or
who fail to meet the program requirements.24

19. See Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Pub L. No. 108-173, 177 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (providing the only significant reform to Medicare during
that time).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(1)(A) (2012). See also CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
Medicaid Incentives for the Prevention of Chronic Diseases Model,
https://innovation.cms.gov/innovation-models/mipcd (providing grants to states under the Affordable
Care Act to institute “comprehensive, evidence-based, widely available, and easily accessible”
prevention programs to provide incentives to Medicaid beneficiaries who “demonstrate changes in
health risk and outcomes, including the adoption of healthy behaviors”); Trump Administration
Announces Opportunity for States to Participate in Wellness Program Demonstration Project, CTR. FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/trump-administration-announces-opportunity-states-participate-wellness-programdemonstration-project (describing an opportunity for up to 10 states to implement a wellness program
for individuals purchasing coverage on the individual market).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§300gg-4(j)(1)(A) (2012) (describing wellness programs as being offered by
employers to promote health); § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B) (stating that wellness programs that require
individuals to satisfy a requirement based on a health status factor “shall be reasonably designed to
promote health or prevent disease. A program complies with the preceding sentence if the program has a
reasonable chance of improving the health of, or preventing disease in, participating individuals and it is
not overly burdensome, is not a subterfuge for discriminating based on a health status factor, and is not
highly suspect in the method chosen to promote health or prevent disease.”).
22. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(ii), (iv), (v) (2019) (providing examples of participatory wellness
programs, activity-only wellness programs, and outcome-based wellness programs).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2012). “A reward may be in the form of a discount or rebate of a
premium or contribution, a waiver of all or part of a cost-sharing mechanism (such as deductibles,
copayments, or coinsurance), the absence of a surcharge, or the value of a benefit that would otherwise
not be provided under the plan.” Id.
24. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(3)(iv) (2019). Individuals who cannot meet the requirements of a
wellness program due to a medical condition must be provided a “reasonable alternate standard” to meet
in order to obtain a reward. Id.
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A. Employer-Sponsored Wellness Programs
Employer-sponsored wellness programs have been in existence for quite
some time, pre-dating the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter “ADA”)
of 1990. They started appearing in the 1970s as corporations sought ways to hold
down employee health care costs, reduce absenteeism, improve morale, and
increase productivity.25 These programs take two different forms. The first,
“participatory” wellness programs, offer employees access to some program like
a free or discounted gym membership, regardless of outcome.26 Such programs
seek to prioritize “healthy” behaviors, but do so by offering carrots, not sticks.
These programs are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no negative
outcome for failing to participate. As such, they do not impinge on a person’s
freedom or privacy, but instead increase an individual’s options. The second,
“health-contingent” wellness programs, require participants to meet one or more
health-related goals.27 If a participant meets their goal, then they either receive a
reward or avoid incurring a penalty.28 Unlike participatory wellness programs,
health-contingent wellness programs raise a number of problems, and are the
subject of further discussion, below.
The rising cost of health care in the 2000s, along with the carve out in the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (hereinafter
“HIPAA”) for wellness programs, gave wellness programs a boost in the initial
years of this century.29 In the 2000s, employers increasingly incentivized
participation in these voluntary programs by providing, as permitted under
HIPAA, either an incentive merely for participating in a non-health contingent
wellness program, or up to a 20% discount on employee insurance premium costs
to employees who meet a particular health goal in a health contingent wellness
program.30 Between 2006 and 2009, for example, the percentage of employers
25. Peter Conrad, Wellness in the Workplace: Potentials and Pitfalls of Work-Site Health
Promotion, 65 MILBANK Q. 255, 257 (1987).
26. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FAQS ABOUT AFFORDABLE CARE ACT IMPLEMENTATION PART V AND
MENTAL HEALTH PARITY IMPLEMENTATION, 6 (2010),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/aca-partv.pdf.
27. Id.
28. Id. For a list of some typical incentives and penalties that may be found in such wellness
programs see, e.g., Bahaudin G. Mujtaba & Frank J. Cavico, Corporate Wellness Programs:
Implementation Challenges in the Modern American Workplace, 1 INT. J. HEALTH POL’Y & MGMT. 193,
196 (2013) (listing strategies such as offering free gym membership, reducing premiums for losing
weight or lowering cholesterol, charging overweight employees and smokers a health premium
surcharge, and charging a premium surcharge to employees who fail to obtain preventive healthcare).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3) (permitting employers to reward employees based on their
achievement of particular health status factors in the context of permitted wellness programs).
30. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed.
Reg. 75014, 75017-18 (Dec. 13, 2006) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 146) (describing the incentive as
exceptions to HIPAA’s strict nondiscrimination provisions to allow employers to provide rewards to
employees for participation in wellness programs, regardless of outcome).
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offering health plans who also offered a wellness program rose from 27% to
74%.31
Wellness programs became increasingly well-established under the Obama
administration and were boosted, at least in theory, from the Affordable Care
Act’s (hereinafter “ACA”) expansion of the maximum possible premium
discount that could be offered under HIPAA from 20% to 30% in the case of
most health contingent wellness programs, or 50% in the case of smoking
cessation wellness programs.32 By 2016, 83% of employers who offer health
insurance also offered at least one wellness program, and 42% of large
employers33 offering wellness programs offered a financial incentive to
employees to participate.34 Fifty-three percent of large employers offered their
employees the opportunity to complete a biometric screening measuring physical
characteristics such as blood pressure, body-mass index, or cholesterol, and
nearly 60% of those employers offered a financial reward to participating
31. Kaiser Family Found., Employer Health Benefits, 2006 Annual Survey, Section12: Employer
Options and Health Management Programs, 1, 138 (2006), https://www.kff.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/7527.pdf; Kaiser Family Found., Employer Health Benefits, 2010 Annual
Survey, Section 12: Wellness Programs, Health Risk Assessment, and Disease Management Programs,
1, 170 (2010), https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/8085.pdf.
32. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg.
33158, 33159, 33167 (June 3, 2013) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 54). The expansion of incentive
values may have had little practical effect in most employment settings, given how small most wellness
plan incentives have been in relation to their potential maximum amount. An Employee Benefit
Research Institute study included data showing that in 2014 of the large employers providing a financial
incentive to complete a health risk assessment, 64% offered an incentive valued at $500 or less. Paul
Fronstein and M. Christopher Roebuck, Financial Incentives, Workplace Wellness Program
Participation, and Utilization of Health Care Services and Spending, 417 EBRI ISSUE BRIEF 4, 6, 8
(2015). RAND found in its 2012 Employer Survey that the median incentive value among employers
offering an incentive was $300. Soeren Mattke et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Study: Final
Report, RAND 1, 76 (2013),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR254/RAND_RR254.pdf. More
recently, the 2019 Kaiser Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey found that 54% of large firms
offering any incentive to complete a health promotion or screening program offered one with a value of
$500 or less. Kaiser Family Found., 2019 Employer Health Benefits, Section 12: Health and Wellness
Programs, fig. 12.16 (2019), https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2019-section-12-health-andwellness-programs/. Only seven percent offered an incentive valued at $2,001 or more. Id. Incentives
must be valued at more than $2,001 to approach the upper limits set by the ACA for an average-priced,
employer sponsored, individual health insurance plan. See Kaiser Family Found., 2019 Employer Health
Benefits, Section 1: Cost of Health Insurance, (2019), https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2019section-1-cost-of-health-insurance/ (finding the average cost of an employer-sponsored, individual plan
was $7,188 in 2019); Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78
Fed. Reg. 33158-01, 33159, 3316760-33161 (June 3, 2013) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 54)
(increasing the maximum premium discount to 30% of the total cost of employee-only coverage).
33. HIPAA defines large employers as those “who employed an average of at least 51 employees
on business days during the preceding calendar year and who employ[] at least 2 employees on the first
day of the plan year.” 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(e)(2).
34. Kaiser Family Found., Employer Health Benefits, 2016 Annual Survey, Section 12: Health Risk
Assessment, Biometrics Screening and Wellness Programs, 1, 212, 225 (2016),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-2016-Annual-Survey.
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employees.35 Fifty-nine percent of large employers offered employees a health
risk assessment tool, and 54% of those firms provided one or more incentives to
help induce employees to utilize the tool.36 These percentages have changed little
under the Trump administration. 37
Despite the wide adoption of wellness programs by many employers, the
evidence for the programs’ effectiveness is mixed at best. Numerous articles in
the legal literature that examine the evidence on the effectiveness of wellness
programs have found it wanting.38 Two recent studies bear remark. In contrast to
35. Id. at 213.
36. Id. at 212.
37. See Kaiser Family Found., Employer Health Benefits, 2018 Annual Survey, Section 12: Health
and Wellness Programs (2018), http://files.kff.org/attachement/Report-Employer-Health-BenefitsAnnual-Survey-2018 (providing up to date data on health and wellness programs offered by employers).
Approximately 82% of health insurance-offering employers also offered at least one wellness program
in 2018. Id. at 189. Biometric screening was offered by 50% of large firms and of those 60% offered
employees incentives to participate in the screening. Id. at 193. Sixty-two percent of large employers
offered health risk assessments in 2018 and 51% of these employers also offered incentives to
employees to participate in the assessments. Id.
38. See, e.g., Lindsay F. Wiley, Access to Health Care as an Incentive for Healthy Behavior? An
Analysis of the ACA’s Personal Responsibility for Wellness Reforms, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 635, 665
(2014) (finding that in 2014 “[e]valuation of the impact of these programs is limited. Only about half of
employers who have wellness programs report that they have evaluated them”); Kristin Madison,
Employer Wellness Incentives, The ACA, and the ADA: Reconciling Policy Objectives, 51 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 407, 415 (2015) (explaining that is unclear whether wellness incentives work, and “[a]s is the
case for wellness programs in general, the answer is unclear”); Emily Koruda, More Carrot, Less Stick:
Workplace Wellness Programs and the Discriminatory Impact of Financial and Health-Based
Incentives, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 131, 144-45 (2016) (noting, among other issues, that “many
studies on the effectiveness of these programs run up against inherent flaws. Selection bias, for example,
is a concern. In a study examining the overall health of individuals within a wellness program, if only
the healthiest employees enrolled in the program, a comparison between participants and nonparticipants
will likely be skewed to show more progress than is actually occurring. Other concerns with conducting
studies include low response rates and publication biases” (citations omitted)); Elizabeth A. Brown,
Workplace Wellness: Social Injustice, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 213 (2017) (noting among
other issues that “[w]riting in 2013, the [federal agencies charged with analyzing the final rule on
Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs] noted that ‘currently, insufficient broad-based
evidence makes it difficult to definitively assess the impact of workplace wellness programs on health
outcomes and cost’” (citation omitted)); Adrianna McIntyre et al., The Dubious Empirical and Legal
Foundations of Workplace Wellness Programs, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 59, 65, 73 (2017) (finding that
several reasonably well-devised “studies that rigorously evaluate the experience of individual firms with
wellness programs” and “several meta-analyses that have helped frame contemporary discussion around
employer-based wellness initiatives” demonstrate that the programs have only “questionable efficacy”);
Jessica L. Roberts & Leah R. Fowler, How Assuming Autonomy May Undermine Wellness Programs, 27
HEALTH MATRIX 101, 111 (2017) (describing how “some of these programs have been described as
poorly designed, haphazard, not evidence-based, inadequately resourced, not culturally supported, and
ineffective”); Al Lewis, The Outcomes, Economics and Ethics of the Workplace Wellness Industry, 27
HEALTH MATRIX 1, 13, 23-24, 36 (2017) (detailing the failure of wellness programs to reduce hospital
admissions for conditions related to health behavior, the economic ineffectiveness of wellness programs,
and problems with assertions of clinical effectiveness in the programs); Camila Strassle & Benjamin E.
Berkman, Workplace Wellness Programs: Empirical Doubt, Legal Ambiguity, and Conceptual
Confusion, 61 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1663, 1672-73 (2020) (“In short, the early evidence regarding
wellness program effectiveness was fragmentary, poorly operationalized, and often observational,
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most prior studies, both were randomized control trials.39 Both also found the
wellness programs they studied to have little significant effect on employee
behavior and health outcomes.40
The first study – the Illinois Workplace Wellness Study – examined a
wellness program implemented at the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign.41 The study offered all 12,459 benefits-eligible employees at the
university the opportunity to complete a baseline health and wellness survey in
exchange for a $30 Amazon.com gift card.42 The 4,834 participants who
completed the survey were provided with the chance to participate in the second
part of the study.43 Of those 4,834 participants, 3,300 were randomly chosen to
participate in the “treatment” group, whereas the remaining 1,534 were assigned
to the control group and were not permitted to participate.44 All participants
completed health surveys and underwent annual biometric screenings.45
Members of the treatment group were offered monetary rewards to participate in
the screening, health risk assessment (HRA), and periodic wellness activities
ranging from $50 to $350 for the first year of the study and smaller rewards
during the second year of the study.46 The researchers found no statistically
significant effect of wellness program participation on health care spending,
employee productivity, or employee health behaviors.47 Of the 42 outcome
measures studied, only two yielded any statistically significant difference
between participants and nonparticipants during the first year of the study period:
(1) participants were more likely than nonparticipants to have had a health
screening, and (2) participants were more likely than nonparticipants to believe
that the management cared about their health and safety.48

suggesting a surprisingly weak state of the science on program benefit,” and “[n]ewer studies further
undermine the assumptions that policymakers drew from the earlier data”).
39. Damon Jones et al., What Do Workplace Wellness Programs Do? Evidence from the Illinois
Workplace Wellness Study, Q. J. ECON. 1747, 1748-49 (2019); Zirui Song & Katherine Baicker, Effect of
a Workplace Wellness Program on Employee Health and Economic Outcomes, 321 J. AM. MEDICAL
ASS’N 1491, 1492 (2019).
40. See infra notes 44-45, 53-56 and accompanying text.
41. Jones, et al., supra note 39, at 1747 n.*.
42. Id. at 1754-56.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1756 (indicating that members of the control group were “notified they may be contacted
for follow-up surveys in the future,” and therefore any contact with this group was greatly reduced).
45. Id. (noting that the first step of the program “included a biometric health screening and an
online [health risk assessment]”).
46. Id. at 1757, 1785-86 (noting that rewards were decreased during the second year due to a
smaller budget and “the diminished effect of incentives on participation” during the first year).
47. Id. at 1776-79.
48. Id. at 1779.
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The second study, conducted by Zirui Song and Katherine Baicker, was a
follow-up to their widely cited 2010 wellness program study.49 It examined a
wellness program implemented at 20 randomly-selected BJ’s Wholesale Club
worksites.50 An additional 20 randomly-selected BJ’s Wholesale Club worksites
were selected as primary controls, and 120 remaining sites were secondary
controls.51 The wellness program consisted of eight modules lasting four to eight
weeks, covering health and wellness topics.52 Participants typically received a
$25 BJ’s gift card for completion of a module, with overall potential incentives
totaling $250 on average.53 At the treatment sites, 35.2% of employees
completed at least one wellness program module, and 21.4% completed at least
three.54 At the 18th month of the program, 25.8% of employees participated in
the health assessment survey and 25.5% participated in the biometric screening.55
Workers at treatment sites were 8.3% more likely than those at control sites to
report engaging in physical exercise and 13.6% more likely to report engaging
in active weight management, but otherwise reported few statistically significant
differences in health behaviors.56 There were no statistically significant
differences in clinical measures of health, health spending, or health care
utilization between treatment and control groups.57 There was also no significant
effect on absenteeism, work performance, or tenure.58 In short, both the BJ
Wholesale Club study and the Illinois Workplace Wellness study found little
impact for all the effort and expense involved.59
Wellness programs nevertheless persist. In some cases, it may be that they
offer a “feel good” strategy for raising employee morale, but other considerations
may be at work. For example, HIPAA, as enacted in 1996, only obliquely
addressed wellness programs.60 When the legislation that ultimately became
HIPAA was introduced, the Senate bill sponsor described it as “build[ing] upon

49. See generally Katherine Baicker et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Can Generate Savings,
29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1 (2010) (providing an overview of the 2010 study).
50. Song & Baicker, supra note 39, at 1492.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1495.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1495-97.
57. Id. at 1497-99.
58. Id. at 1499.
59. See id.; Jones et al., supra note 39.
60. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 [hereinafter HIPAA], Pub. L. No.
104-191 § 2702(b)(2)(B), 110 Stat. 1936, 1961 (1996) (providing that, notwithstanding HIPAA’s
protections charging different rates to similarly-situated enrollees in the same group health plan, the plan
may nevertheless “establish[] premium discounts or rebates or modify[] otherwise applicable
copayments or deductibles in return for adherence to programs of health promotion and disease
prevention”).
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and strengthen[ing] the private insurance market by making it easier for
individuals and families to obtain health insurance coverage and to keep their
coverage when they change jobs.”61 HIPAA’s portability provisions were a
primary focus of the legislation, and in instituting group market protections for
individuals with pre-existing conditions, the Act also substantially equalized
costs and liabilities for employees, no matter what their health status might be.62
The law did, however, permit employers to “establish[] premium discounts or
rebates or modify[] otherwise applicable copayments or deductibles in return for
adherence to programs of health promotion and disease prevention.”63 In 2006,
regulations were ultimately promulgated to institute guardrails for workplace
wellness programs in light of HIPAA’s nondiscrimination provisions.64 The
regulations were intended in part to prohibit wellness programs from becoming
a subterfuge for discrimination.65
Nevertheless, permitting health-contingent wellness programs to exist, with
their differential treatment of compliant and non-compliant employees, arguably
allowed a certain degree of disparate treatment of employees based on health
status.66 Health-contingent wellness programs can be intrusive and punitive, and
61. Health Insurance Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1028 Before the S. Comm. On Labor and Human
Resources, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Chairman S. Comm. Of
Labor and Human Resources).
62. HIPAA § 2702(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §300gg-4(b)(1).
63. See HIPAA § 702(b)(2)(B) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(2)(B)); see also Interim Rules for
Health Insurance Portability for Group Health Plans, 62 Fed. Reg. 16894, 16939, 16953, 16969 (Apr. 8,
1997) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 144, 146).
64. See Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71
Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,017 (Dec. 13, 2006) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45
C.F.R. pt. 146) (providing discussion on final rules promulgated to prohibit discrimination based on
health factors). “The HIPAA nondiscrimination provisions do not prevent a plan or issuer from
establishing discounts or rebates or modifying otherwise applicable copayments or deductibles in return
for adherence to programs of health promotion and disease prevention. The 1997 interim rules refer to
these programs as ‘bona fide wellness programs.’ In the preamble to the 1997 interim rules, the
Departments invited comments on whether additional guidance was needed concerning, among other
things, the permissible standards for determining bona fide wellness programs. The Departments also
stated their intent to issue further regulations on the nondiscrimination requirements and that in no event
would the Departments take any enforcement action against a plan or issuer that had sought to comply in
good faith with section 9802 of the Code, section 702 of ERISA, and section 2702 of the PHS Act
before the publication of additional guidance.” Id. at 75,017.
65. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market, 45 C.F.R.
§ 146.121(f)(3)(iii), § 146.121(f)(4)(iii).
66. “The ‘reasonably designed’ requirement is intended to be an easy standard to satisfy. To make
this clear, the final regulations have added language providing that if a program has a reasonable chance
of improving the health of participants and it is not overly burdensome, is not a subterfuge for
discriminating based on a health factor, and is not highly suspect in the method chosen to promote health
or prevent disease, it satisfies this standard. There does not need to be a scientific record that the method
promotes wellness to satisfy this standard.” Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health
Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,018 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 146)
(demonstrating the ease in meeting the standard to be considered nondiscriminatory without scientific
data to support the determination, which could leave room; see also Horwitz et al., infra note 72 at 474
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the rules governing them can be contradictory or unclear. Employers have, for
example, required participation in such wellness programs as a necessary
condition for participating in the employer’s health plan,67 receiving employer
contributions to premiums,68 and avoiding an insurance surcharge,69 among other
matters. Some of those practices would likely no longer pass legal muster as a
result of subsequent rulemaking.70 However, the contours of permitted
requirements remain unsettled.71
At the same time, the low participation rate for employees in health
contingent wellness programs suggests that these wellness plans both can be and
are being used as a means for employers to shift costs onto less healthy
employees. In a review of studies of health contingent workplace wellness
programs focusing on smoking, obesity, high cholesterol, and hypertension,

(discussing the potential for wellness programs to be inefficient and even discriminatory if employers
shifted costs onto certain employees).
67. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Flambeau, 846 F.3d 941, 945 (7th Cir. 2017)
(explaining a situation in which an employee’s health insurance was terminated after the employee
failed to complete a health risk assessment).
68. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Orion Energy Systems, 208 F.Supp.3d 989, 992 (E.D.
Wisc. 2016) (discussing an employer that required employees to either complete a health risk
assessment or pay the entire monthly premium).
69. See Seff v. Broward Cty, 778 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (describing an employer
that required employees to pay a $20 surcharge for not participating in the wellness program).
70. The EEOC disavowed the Seff and Flambeau court’s excessively “expansive[]” use of the
ADA’s safe harbor provision in 2016 rulemaking: “The employers in Seff and Flambeau did not use
wellness programs in a manner consistent with the application of the safe harbor provision. In neither
Seff nor Flambeau did the employer or its health plan use wellness program data to determine
insurability or to calculate insurance rates based on risks associated with certain conditions—the
practices the safe harbor provision was intended to permit. Moreover, there is no evidence in either Seff
or Flambeau that the decision to impose a surcharge or to exclude an employee from coverage under a
health plan was based on actual risks that non-participating employees posed.” Regulations Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act 81 Fed. Reg. 31126, 31131 (2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630). Accordingly, the EEOC clarified that a wellness program will only be considered “voluntary”
under the ADA if it, inter alia, “(i) Does not require employees to participate; (ii) Does not deny
coverage under any of its group health plans or particular benefits packages within a group health plan
for non-participation, or limit the extent of benefits… for employees who do not participate; (iii) Does
not take any adverse employment action or retaliate against, interfere with, coerce, intimidate, or
threaten employees within the meaning… of the ADA. . .” 26 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(i)-(iii) (2018).
71. See AARP v. EEOC, 267 F. Supp.3d 14, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (explaining the problematic
nature of the term “voluntary” regarding wellness programs though discussion of its use in the GINA
(Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act) rule). “EEOC’s explanation for its chosen interpretation of
‘voluntary’ in the GINA rule fares no better than its explanation in the ADA rule—principally because
EEOC relies primarily on its decision in the ADA rule as the basis for its decision here. Therefore, the
Court again finds that the agency has failed to give a reasoned explanation for its decision to interpret
the term voluntary to allow incentives of up to 30% of the cost of self-only coverage.” Id. EEOC
subsequently vacated the portions of the ADA and GINA rules concerning maximum incentives
permissible for wellness programs. Removal of Final ADA Wellness Rule Vacated by Court 83 Fed.
Reg. 65296, 65296 (Dec. 20, 2018) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630); Removal of the Final GINA
Wellness Rule Vacated by Court, 83 Fed. Reg. 65296, 65296 (Dec. 20, 2018) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1635).
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Professor Jill Horwitz and colleagues found little evidence that financial
incentives encouraged employees to make lasting changes to their behavior.72
Additionally, the studies offered mixed evidence on whether behavioral changes
resulted in cost savings to the employer, therefore calling for more research to
be done.73 The authors hypothesized that any savings may result from costshifting onto noncompliant employees rather than from long-term improved
employee health.74 No studies appear to exist that examine this issue, so there is
no direct evidence to support or refute this point.75 However, as Horwitz and her
colleagues briefly outline, and as ample other studies evidence, people with
lower socioeconomic status are more likely than individuals with higher status
to be obese, smoke, or have chronic health problems that might benefit from
lifestyle changes.76 It would stand to reason, they suggest, that wellness programs
would, in turn, disproportionately penalize such people.77
There are surprisingly few studies examining the relative socioeconomic
status of employees who participate successfully, participate unsuccessfully, or
opt not to participate in health-contingent wellness programs with financial
incentives. One of the few to do so involved a program implemented among
public employees in Oregon.78 The program used the “play or pay” model, where
employees who chose not to participate were charged $35 extra per month for

72. See Jill Horwitz et al., Wellness Incentives in the Workplace: Cost Savings Through Cost
Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 468, 471-72 (2013).
73. See id. at 469, 474.
74. Id. at 473-74.
75. Id. at 474.
76. Id. at 473. See also Fred C. Pampel et al., Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Behaviors, 36
ANNUAL REV. SOCIOLOGY 349 (2010) (studying the relationship between socioeconomic status and
health behaviors); Michelle Miller et al., Household Socioeconomic Status Modifies the Association
Between Neighborhood SES and Obesity in a Nationally Representative Sample of First Grade Children
in the United States, 20 PREVENTIVE MED. REPORTS 101207 (2020),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211335520301662 (finding that children living in
low-SES homes or low-SES neighborhoods had an increased incidence of obesity); MeLisa R. Creamer
et al., Tobacco Product Use and Cessation Indicators Among Adults — United States, 2018, 68
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1013, 1015 (2018) (finding tobacco use to be higher among
people with a GED as compared to those with higher educational attainment and among those earning
under $35,000 as compared to higher incomes).
77. Horowitz et al., supra note 72, at 474. “Our review found, at best, conflicting evidence that
people with the conditions typically included in wellness pro-grams spend more on health care than
others and, therefore, offer particularly attractive sources for cost reduction; respond to financial
incentives with behavior changes; and thus improve their health. How can these findings be reconciled
with claims that wellness programs have reduced employers’ costs? … [T]he evidence makes it quite
plausible that employees with health risks are paying more for their care, subsidizing the healthy
employees in the programs.” Id.
78. Bill J. Wright et al., Does Skin in the Game Matter if You Aren’t Playing? Examining
Engagement in Oregon’s Public Employee Health Engagement Model, 31 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION
28, 29 (2017) (stating that socioeconomic status and other demographic and person characteristics were
considered variables in the study).
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their benefits.79 The 86% of employees who chose to participate had to complete
a health risk assessment and take at least two online health education classes over
the next year.80 Employees were less likely to participate in the program if they
earned less than $40,000 per year, had a lower level of education, and/or had at
least one health risk factor, such as obesity or smoking.81 Nonparticipants cited
worries about the intrusiveness of the information they were asked to share
(67%), problems with information security (40%), and potential adverse impact
on their employment or pay (18%).82 The study did not examine the monetary
effect on the employer or on participants.
The Illinois Workplace Wellness Study, discussed earlier, also examined
the socioeconomic status of individuals who participated versus nonparticipants.83 Participating employees are less likely to either have high income
or to be in the bottom quartile of income as compared to nonparticipating
employees84 The share of participants who previously participated in a major
local “running event is 8.9 percentage points larger than the share among
nonparticipants.”85 Overall, the researchers observed that:
Our results are broadly consistent with these concerns: participating
employees are less likely to have very high medical spending, less
likely to be in the bottom quartile of income, and more likely to engage
in healthy physical activities. At the same time, participating
employees are also less likely to have very low medical spending or
have very high incomes, which suggests a more nuanced story.86
Additionally, the Illinois Workplace Wellness Study had another finding
relevant to an issue raised by Horwitz and colleagues.87 In the 13 months prior
to the study, participating employees spent significantly less per month on health
care – $115.30, on average - than those who did not participate, although they
were more likely prior to the study’s commencement to have nonzero medical

79. Id.
80. Id. at 29-30.
81. Id. at 30-31 (observing that employees who make more than $80,000 per year “were nearly
twice as likely to sign up” as employees who make less than $40,000 per year). The study also found
that “more educated employees were more likely to sign up, whereas employees in predominantly ‘blue
collar’ agencies (e.g., corrections and law enforcement) were among the least likely to participate.” Id. at
32.
82. Id. at 31. The authors noted that the “data suggest that employees sometimes feared that the
personal health information they were being asked to provide could place their certification, job, or
salary at risk.” Id. at 32.
83. Jones et al., supra note 39, at 1750 (examining evidence of employee “productivity,” which
included variables such as sick leave, salary, promotions, hours worked, job satisfaction, and job
search).
84. Jones et al., supra note 39, at 1771.
85. Jones et al., supra note 39, at 1770.
86. Jones et al., supra note 39, at 1771.
87. See Jones et al., supra note 41.
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spending than nonparticipants.88 The researchers observed that, if wellness
programs are a significant draw for employees similar to the participants in the
study, then employers could realize a substantial reduction in health care costs
by offering such a program in recruiting new employees.89
B. Medicaid Personal Responsibility Provisions
Just as in private coverage, personal responsibility provisions also creep
into Medicaid.90 In the context of Medicaid, this trend had its genesis in the Bush
administration, which sought to involve private entities to help address public
problems.91 To address the issue of uninsured lower-income Americans, the
Bush administration quickly sought to encourage states to partner with private
entities, particularly private insurers, in expanding Medicaid coverage through §
1115 waivers.92 During Bush’s first term, states seeking these Health Insurance
Flexibility and Accountability (hereinafter “HIFA”) waivers did so with the
stated goal of expanding coverage to populations who otherwise lacked it, with
an emphasis on prioritizing public-private partnerships.93
88. Jones et al., supra note 41, at 1767-69.
89. Jones et al., supra note 41, at 1772. The researchers further observed, however, that
participation in the wellness program had no significant effect on employee retention. Jones et al., supra
note 33, at 1772.
90. For examples of such provisions, see infra, note 99 and accompanying text (discussing, inter
alia, incentivizing beneficiaries to obtain preventive health services and, if unemployed, to obtain
employment).
91. See, e.g., HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., HEALTH INSURANCE FLEXIBILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY WAIVER INITIATIVE (2001),
https://web.archive.org/web/20010821103242/http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/hifademo.htm (noting that
the Bush administration would prioritize state approaches that used Medicaid and State Children’s
Health Insurance Program funds to “maximize private health insurance coverage options” for lowincome Americans).
92. Id. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
at a state’s request, to waive certain federal requirements concerning Medicaid so that the state can test
an experimental project that the Secretary believes will further Medicaid’s goals. 42 U.S.C. §
1315(a)(1).
93. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., supra note 91. Between December of 2001 and December
of 2006, only fifteen states applied for and received such waivers and many of those states that obtained
a waiver had few participants. Adam Atherly et al., The Effect of HIFA Waiver Expansions on
Uninsurance Rates in Adult Populations, 47 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 939, 940–43 (2012),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3423173/pdf/hesr0047-0939.pdf (including data on
enrollment in Table 1). Advocates for the poor were skeptical of the administration’s emphasis on
private partnerships and some states’ attempts to make Medicaid coverage assume features of private
coverage. See generally Edwin Park & Leighton Ku, Administration Medicaid and SCHIP Waiver
Policy Encourages States to Scale Back Benefits Significantly and Increase Cost-Sharing for LowIncome Beneficiaries, 8-10 (Aug. 15, 2001), https://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/8-15-01health.pdf
(noting that populations gaining coverage under HIFA waiver expansions may receive only limited
benefits, and that governments may pay more to subsidize skimpier private plans than they would if they
simply expanded Medicaid). Moreover, because of budget neutrality requirements and other constraints,
the coverage offered to optional or expansion populations through HIFA coverage sometimes limited
benefits and/or charged higher costs to beneficiaries. See Robin Rudowitz et al., A Look at § 1115
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Even in the absence of such partnerships, however, the Bush administration
was also open to Medicaid § 1115 waivers that sought merely to make the public
program mimic certain features sometimes found in private coverage, such as
wellness programs and flexible spending accounts, though often with more
punitive effects.94 We first see states seeking to insert personal responsibility
requirements into Medicaid with Florida’s “Medicaid Reform” § 1115
Demonstration Waiver, and most notably later in the Healthy Indiana Plan
waiver.95 The latter waiver included features such as a “Personal Wellness and
Medicaid Demonstration Waivers under the ACA: A Focus on Childless Adults (2013),
https://www.kff.org/report-section/section-1115-medicaid-demonstration-waivers-issuebrief/#endnote_link_88161-5 (pointing out that “many of these [HIFA] waivers provided these adults
more limited benefits and charged them higher cost sharing than otherwise allowed in Medicaid.
Moreover, some of these waivers covered these adults through a premium assistance model that allowed
the state to use Medicaid funds to subsidize the purchase of private insurance that did not meet
minimum Medicaid benefit or cost sharing rules without requiring the state to supplement that coverage
with wraparound benefits or cost sharing”). See also HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., supra note 91
(explaining the budget neutrality requirements of HIFA). Nevertheless, the program appears to have had
at least some positive impact. For example, Adam Atherly and colleagues found that in the six states that
implemented a HIFA waiver program with at least 1,000 general participants, “the probability of being
insured increased by 6.4 percentage points between the preimplementation and postimplementation
periods in the HIFA-eligible sample relative to the control groups.” Adam Atherly, Brian E. Dowd,
Robert F. Coulam et al., The Effect of HIFA Waiver Expansions on Uninsurance Rates in Adult
Populations, 47 HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 939, 946, 957 (2012). Notably, the study did not consider
the nature or quality of the coverage gained in each program, which could be variable given the absence
of benefit or other requirements that states had to meet in the coverage they offered to participants who
were not otherwise eligible for Medicaid. Id. at 943 (highlighting the unique nature of each states’
program, making it impossible to identify effect of certain elements of the program. Quality may in
many cases have been limited, given CMS’s budget neutrality requirement for § 1115 waivers, including
HIFA waivers. See, e.g., MACPAC, Section 1115 Research and Demonstration Waivers,
https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/section-1115-research-and-demonstration-waivers/ (“Section 1115
waivers are required to be budget-neutral, meaning that federal spending under the waiver cannot exceed
what it would have been in absence of the waiver. Although not defined by federal statue or regulations,
this requirement has been in practice for many years”).
94. See generally Laura D. Hermer, Personal Responsibility: A Plausible Social Goal, but not for
Medicaid Reform, 38 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 16, 17 (2008) (discussing measures the George W.
Bush administration sought to promote in state Medicaid plans and § 1115 waivers).
95. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, NO. 11W-00206/4, MEDICAID REFORM SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION (2006) [hereinafter Florida Section
1115 Demonstration STCs],
https://ahca.myflorida.com/medicaid/Policy_and_Quality/Policy/federal_authorities/federal_waivers/Ar
chive/waiver/pdfs/cms_special_terms_and_conditions.pdf (providing the Special Terms and Conditions
(STCs) for the Florida Medicaid Reform §1115 Medicaid Demonstration which describes details on the
nature of the program; CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND
CONDITIONS, No. 11-W-00206/4, HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN (2008) [hereinafter Indiana Section 1115
Demonstration STCs], https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-HIP/in-healthy-indiana-plan-stc-0101200812312012-amended-012010.pdf (providing the Special Terms and Conditions (STCs) for Indiana’s
Healthy Indiana Plan §1115 Medicaid Demonstration which describes details on the nature of the
program). In Florida’s waiver approval STCs, “patient responsibility and empowerment” was cited as a
key “principle of reform.” Florida Section 1115 Demonstration STCs at 1. CMS’s Special Terms and
Conditions for the waiver noted that, under the waiver, beneficiaries will “be expected to take an active
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Responsibility” (POWER) Account, to which certain beneficiaries had to
contribute as a condition of maintaining benefits.96 The Special Terms and
Conditions of that waiver, as granted by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (hereinafter “CMS”), identified the goals Indiana expected to achieve
with the waiver – including “Prevention: Encourage individuals to stay healthy
and seek preventive care” and “Personal Responsibility: Give individuals control
of their health care decisions and incentivize positive health behaviors.”97 In
approving this waiver, CMS apparently decided for the first time that prioritizing
healthiness and personal responsibility ostensibly fell within the objectives of
Medicaid.98
The mainstreaming of emphasizing health and inserting personal
responsibility requirements in Medicaid started in earnest with the Florida and
Indiana waivers, but the worst excesses of these features were kept at least
partially in check through the Bush administration’s apparent respect for §
1115’s requirement to prioritize the goal of medical assistance in granting
Medicaid waivers.99 Not until the Obama administration, ironically, did
Medicaid personal responsibility requirements really take off.100
CMS under the Obama administration was initially disinclined to grant §
1115 waivers that did not hew closely to Medicaid’s purpose of providing
medical assistance to qualified individuals and families. Many HIFA waivers
role in their health care. Id. They will have the flexibility to choose from a variety of benefit packages
and be able to choose the package that best meets their needs. Additionally, they will be rewarded for
demonstrating healthy practices and personal responsibility.” Id. CMS did not, however, specifically
identify these – or any other waiver feature, for that matter – as furthering the objectives of Medicaid
generally. See id. (failing to discuss how these requirements advances the goals of Medicaid).
96. Indiana Section 1115 Demonstration STCs, supra note 95, at 1-2. Additionally, if a beneficiary
regularly obtained certain preventive services, she could carry over unused balances in her “POWER”
account from year to year. Id. at 23-24.
97. Indiana Section 1115 Demonstration STCs, supra note 95, at 2-3.
98. Indiana Section 1115 Demonstration STCs, supra note 95, at 2-3 (specifying that personal
responsibility over health plays an important role in the program). CMS further noted in its initial
approval letter that, “[w]ith the approval of this demonstration, CMS is permitting the State to test a
model of health coverage that emphasizes private health insurance, personal responsibility, and
‘ownership’ of health care.” Letter from Kerry Weems, Acting Adm’r, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid
Serv., to E. Mitchell Roob, Sec’y, Indiana Family and Soc. Serv. Admin. (Dec. 14, 2007),
https://www.in.gov/fssa/files/IN_-_Healthy_Indiana_Plan_(HIP).pdf.
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2020) (permitting states to seek Medicaid demonstration waivers
which will promote the objectives of Medicaid; 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2020) (citing to Cindy Mann &
Tim Westmoreland, Attending to Medicaid, 32 J.L., MED & ETHICS 416, 422 (2004) (stating that a chief
purpose of Medicaid is to “furnish medical assistance”).
100. See, e.g., Robin Rudowitz et al., Medicaid Expansion Waivers: What Will We Learn?, Kaiser
Family Found. (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-expansion-waiverswhat-will-we-learn/ (discussing “common features” of Medicaid expansion waivers such as “a
“premium assistance” model, in which the state uses federal Medicaid funds to purchase Marketplace
coverage for enrollees or other private coverage; enrollee premiums; elimination of the non-emergency
medical transportation benefit, which is otherwise required under Medicaid; and use of “healthy
behavior incentives” to reduce enrollee premiums and/or copayments”).
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granted under the Bush administration met a quiet demise rather than being
renewed during the first years of the Obama administration.101 But after NFIB v.
Sebelius,102 which made the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid to all adults earning
no more than 133% of the federal poverty level optional for states, CMS became
more willing to grant waivers to states as quid pro quo in exchange for Medicaid
expansion.103 In those cases, CMS justified the waivers on the ground of
promoting “health” rather than expansion of coverage, although expansion was
likely what CMS actually intended to promote.104 CMS appeared to favor more
extensive coverage at some cost to the integrity and goals of the program, rather
than no coverage at all.
The Trump administration followed the Obama administration’s lead in
using the ostensible rationale of health promotion to serve other purposes
regarding Medicaid. However, the Trump administration went in quite a different
direction. Rather than seeking to entice reluctant states to expand Medicaid
coverage, the Trump administration instead cited health as an ostensible rationale
for states to make non-elderly, non-disabled, adult Medicaid beneficiaries satisfy
work requirements and other non-health related measures as a condition to retain
Medicaid coverage.105 Early decision letters from CMS approving such
requirements cited the benefits they would have on beneficiaries’ health and
well-being. Such benefits allegedly range from “incentiviz[ing] uptake of
preventive health services” to
“encourag[ing] beneficiaries to obtain
employment and/or undertake other community engagement activities that
research has shown to be correlated with improved health and wellness” and
“provid[ing] incentives for responsible decision-making.”106 Described in this
101. See, e.g., Laura Hermer, On the Expansion of “Welfare” and “Health” under Medicaid, 9 ST.
LOUIS UNIV. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 235, 241 (2016) (describing the Obama Administration’s actions to
reduce the “arguable excess of Section 1115 waivers”).
102. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 57 U.S. 517 (2012).
103. Hermer, supra note 101, at 242-43 (explaining that states would only agree to expand Medicaid
if certain conditions were waived, such as the ability to institute personal responsibility requirements).
104. See, e.g., CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, NO. 11-W-00245/5, HEALTHY
MICHIGAN SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, (2013) [hereinafter
Michigan Section 1115 Demonstration STCs],
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdhhs/Healthy_Michigan_Plan_2nd_Waiver_STCs_12_17_15_5
08663_7.pdf (listing among the demonstration’s goals, including to “[e]ncourag[e] individuals to seek
preventive care and encourage the adoption of healthy behaviors”).
105. See, e.g., Letter from Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Dir. (Jan. 11,
2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf. “Today, CMS is
committing to support state demonstrations that require eligible adult beneficiaries to engage in work or
community engagement activities (e.g., skills training, education, job search, caregiving, volunteer
service) in order to determine whether those requirements assist beneficiaries in obtaining sustainable
employment or other productive community engagement and whether sustained employment or other
productive community engagement leads to improved health outcomes.” Id. at 3.
106. Letter from Demitrios L. Kouzoukas, Principal Deputy Admin., Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid
Serv., to Steven B. Miller, Comm’r, Kentucky Cabinet for Health Servs. 3–4 (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
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way, CMS has argued that it may be an unfortunate side effect if some, or even
many, lose coverage as a result of the requirements, but that it is simply part of
the cost of encouraging Medicaid beneficiaries to become more responsible and
self-sufficient and allowing states to more productively use scarce resources.107
As discussed earlier in the context of wellness programs, the rationale
underlying Medicaid waivers also matters. The Obama Medicaid expansion
waivers, however much they opened the door to justifying waivers on invalid
grounds, did indeed promote the provision of medical assistance.108 Without
them, it is unlikely that a number of Republican-led states would have expanded
Medicaid. However, obtaining agreement from states like Indiana, Michigan,
and Iowa to expand Medicaid in exchange for permitting the states to curtail nonemergency medical transportation or to lock out some beneficiaries from
coverage if they failed to make required monthly contributions from their meager
incomes or to take other punitive steps undermines the program’s purpose of
extending medical assistance to qualifying populations.109 This is something we
are certainly seeing now under the Trump administration. States ought not to
hold their most vulnerable populations hostage to ideological priorities, and the
federal government ought not to allow them to do this.
The Trump administration’s rationale differs dramatically from that of the
Obama administration. Under Trump, CMS seeks to use Medicaid, in many
cases, like a temporary crutch to help support an individual who is learning to
walk again.110 As the Trump administration would have it, one day, ideally

Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ky/health/ky-health-cms-appvl-011218.pdf (approving Kentucky’s
demonstration project). These rationales have remained relatively constant to date. See, e.g., Letter from
Seema Verma, Admin, Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid Serv., to Nathan Checketts, Director, Utah Dep’t
of Health (March 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/G5Z5-KYMH. (stating that “[w]ith approval of these
amendments to the PCN demonstration, Utah and CMS will be able to evaluate the effectiveness of a
policy that is designed to improve the health of Medicaid beneficiaries and promote their financial
independence. Promoting beneficiary health and independence advances the objectives of the Medicaid
program”).
107. See Letter from Seema Verma, Admin, Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid Serv., to Nathan
Checketts, supra note 106 at 9 (stating that “CMS acknowledges that some beneficiaries could lose
coverage, at least temporarily, for failure to comply with the demonstration’s community engagement
requirement. However, it furthers the Medicaid program’s objectives to allow states to seek innovative
means of deploying their limited state resources in ways that may allow them to provide coverage to
individuals beyond the statutory minimum…”).
108. See The Advisory Board, Where the States Stand on Medicaid Expansion (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/resources/primers/medicaidmap (noting the number of people
who gained coverage in each state through the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, including the states that
accomplished their expansion through a § 1115 waiver).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1(1).
110. In a 2018 speech, CMS Administrator Seema Verma said,
The problem too often is that the most well-meaning government policies trap people in a
hopeless cycle of poverty, making it too difficult to escape, and too easy to become more
dependent. Instead, we ought to insist that the able-bodied participate in earning benefits. To
quote from Arthur [Brook]’s book, The Conservative Heart: ’Work gives people something
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sooner than later, the individual will be able to throw the crutch of Medicaid
away and walk on his own. If she or he is unable to do so, the crutch may be
removed.111
PART II: SOME ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH WORKPLACE
WELLNESS PLANS AND MEDICAID PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
The difference in the ends sought, respectively, by the Obama
administration and the Trump administration matter: The Obama administration
simply sought to encourage Medicaid expansion by states that would likely
otherwise have refrained from doing so; the Trump administration, on the other
hand, is seeking to both fundamentally change and diminish the program itself.112

welfare never can. It’s a sense of self-worth and mastery, the feeling that we are in control of
our lives. This is a source of abiding joy. There’s a reason that Aristotle wrote “happiness
belongs to the self-sufficient.’ … It’s easier to give someone a card, it’s much harder to build
a ladder to help people climb their way out of poverty. But even though it is harder, it’s the
right thing to do.
CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, Remarks by Administrator Seema Verma at the 2018
Medicaid Managed Care Summit (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/speech-remarks-administrator-seema-verma-2018-medicaid-managed-care-summit. The Trump
administration was more explicit in its Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in
the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment in Stewart v. Azar, in which it defended Secretary Azar’s
approval of Kentucky’s KY HEALTH Medicaid demonstration project: “Although plaintiffs call it a
simple benefits cut, KY HEALTH is not designed to withdraw health insurance coverage from
vulnerable people. Rather, it is designed (in part) to help people transition, or graduate, to commercial
coverage.” Stewart v. Azar, Civil Action No. 1:18-cv -15, Memorandum in Support of Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment 24 (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.192935/gov.uscourts.dcd.192935.51.1_1.pdf.
111. For example, CMS describes the community engagement requirement in the Healthy Indiana
Plan as follows:
Indiana will implement a community engagement requirement as a condition of eligibility for
HIP beneficiaries, with exemptions for various groups, including: pregnant women,
beneficiaries considered medically frail, members in active substance use disorder (SUD)
treatment, and students. To remain eligible, non-exempt beneficiaries must complete a
specific number of hours per week of community engagement activities, such as
employment, education, job skills training, and community service for eight months in the
12-month calendar year. Beneficiaries will have their eligibility suspended in the new
calendar year for failure to demonstrate compliance with the community engagement
requirement during the prior calendar year. During an eligibility suspension, beneficiaries
may reactivate their eligibility in the month following notification to the state that they
completed a calendar month of required hours. Indiana will provide good cause exemptions
in certain circumstances for beneficiaries who cannot meet requirements.
CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, No. 11-W-00296/5,
HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN, 2 (2018) https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-ProgramInformation/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plancms-amend-appvl-02012018.pdf [hereinafter Healthy Indiana Plan STCs].
112. See e.g., CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SMD 20-001, HEALTHY ADULT
OPPORTUNITY, 1-3, 5-11, 16-25 (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.medicaid.gov/sites/default/files/FederalPolicy-Guidance/Downloads/smd20001.pdf (inviting states to submit “Healthy Adult Opportunity”
waiver applications that would cap a state’s federal Medicaid matching funds in exchange for substantial
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But the means, in both cases, undermine the program. The purpose of Medicaid,
as enacted, is to allow states as far as practicably possible to furnish medical
assistance to certain qualifying individuals.113 Congress nowhere cited health
improvement in describing the program’s purpose.114 Nevertheless, the Obama
administration used this rationale in approving waivers sought by conservative
states wanting to impose personal responsibility requirements as a condition of
expanding Medicaid.115 The approval process for § 1115 waivers, especially
prior to the ACA, has not been characterized as transparent.116 By unmooring the
§ 1115 waiver process even further from its already amorphous and opaque
statutory roots, the Obama administration arguably made it easier for the Trump
administration to justify its approval decisions.117 While CMS, under the Obama
state flexibility to impose work requirements, change or limit benefits, impose cost-sharing, and change
eligibility standards without seeking advance federal approval).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1.
114. See id.
115. See Michigan Section 1115 Demonstration STCs, supra note 104, at 3 (highlighting as a state
goal to encourage “individuals to seek preventative care and encourage the adoption of healthy
behaviors”); CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, No. 11W-00296/5, HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, 2 (2015)
https://secure.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIP_CMS_Approved_STC_Technical_Corrections_5.14.15.pdf
(listing as a goal to encourage “healthy behaviors and appropriate care, including early intervention,
prevention, and wellness”) [hereinafter Indiana Section 1115 Demonstration STCs 2.0]; CTR. FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, No. 11-W-00295, HEALTHY
PENNSYLVANIA 2 (2014), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1115/downloads/pa/Healthy-Pennsylvania-Private-Coverage-Option-Demonstration/pahealthy-ca.pdf (noting that “With this demonstration Pennsylvania proposes to further the objectives of
title XIX by … Encouraging healthy behaviors and appropriate care, including early intervention,
prevention, and wellness”) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Section 1115 Demonstration STCs]; CTR. FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, No. 11-W-00275/9, 21-W00064/9, ARIZONA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT SYSTEM—AHCCCS, A STATEWIDE APPROACH
OF COST EFFECTIVE HEALTH CARE FINANCING 2 (2011) (observing that “[t]he demonstration will also
test the extent to which health outcomes in the overall population are improved by expanding coverage
to additional needy groups”) [hereinafter Arizona Section 1115 Demonstration STCs].
116. See, e.g., Sidney Watson, Out of the Black Box and into the Light: Using Section 1115
Medicaid Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 213 (2015) (highlighting issues of transparency within the Section 1115 Waiver
process). “As the size and number of Section 1115 waivers have grown, so have concerns about the lack
of transparency in the waiver approval process. Section 1115 Medicaid waiver requests have typically
been negotiated behind closed doors: demonstration goals were often not clearly stated, the terms of the
waivers were sometimes vague, and evaluations of demonstrations were often either not done, or not
shared with the public or HHS.” Id. at 214-15.
117. For example, in its Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the
alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment in Stewart v. Azar, the Department of Justice observed that
“[t]he approval of these incentives hardly represents a sea change in the Administration’s position, as
plaintiffs suggest. In its waiver application, the Commonwealth noted that ‘most of the features of
Kentucky HEALTH’ had been approved in other State demonstrations …, and the results of the other
demonstrations informed Kentucky’s project design. For example, during the last Administration, CMS
approved a provision for suspension of coverage for Indiana’s demonstration known as HIP 2.0. … That
project permitted the State to impose disenrollment and a non-eligibility period for beneficiaries with
income over the federal poverty level who fail to pay their premiums, as an incentive to promote
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administration, is hardly the primary entity responsible for the actions of CMS,
under the Trump administration, the former must bear at least a small part of the
blame for what has happened under the latter. Even an ethically “good” end
should not be pursued using means that may be unlawful and that damage already
tenuous norms.118
There are consequences to shifting greater responsibility onto individuals
for ensuring that the parameters of their lives are as healthy as possible. As others
have noted, programs seeking to persuade or pressure individuals to take greater
measures to improve their health carry real potential to unduly burden
comparatively disadvantaged populations.119 Individuals with fewer resources
often have diminished ability to affect their circumstances. It is not at all clear
with respect to such programs where one should draw the line between what is
freely chosen and what is determined by forces outside the participants’ control.
Yet participants are penalized for both.
Take, for example, Medicaid personal responsibility requirements. While
states were largely prevented under the Obama administration from doing other
than offering rewards for behaviors deemed by the state to be “healthy,” under
the Trump administration states have unprecedented freedom to penalize
beneficiaries or even take away their Medicaid coverage for failing to achieve
certain health or “personal responsibility” goals implemented under certain state

program compliance.” Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 110
(internal citation omitted).
118. See, e.g., Stewart v. Azar, 366 F.Supp.3d 125, 131 (D.D.C. 2019) (discussing Kentucky’s
pursuit of approval of a program that would likely cause “nearly 100,000 people to lose coverage,”
threating to end coverage completely if the program was not approved). “Defendants urge the Court to
adopt the proposition that the Secretary need not grapple with the coverage-loss implications of a state’s
proposed project as long as it is accompanied by a threat that the state will de-expand – or, indeed,
discontinue all of Medicaid. By definition, so this argument goes, any number of people covered by an
experimental Medicaid program would be greater than the number if there were no Medicaid at all; as a
result, any demonstration project that leaves any individual on a state’s Medicaid rolls promotes
coverage. The Court cannot concur that the Medicaid Act leaves the Secretary so unconstrained, nor that
the states are so armed to refashion the program Congress designed in any way they choose.” Id.
119. See, e.g., Wendy Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health Promotion: The Role of
Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks and Costs, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 325 (2012)
(explaining that the target population for wellness program typically coincides with lower
socioeconomic groups already burdened with higher prevalence of chronic diseases and other health
concerns). “About half of those with disabilities who work earn poverty-level wages. While it might
seem helpful to create financial incentives for them to reduce their health risks, they may be in the
weakest position to do so. If these individuals do not succeed in qualifying for discounts or rewards,
they will pay a larger share of their smaller income to obtain the same health insurance available to
everyone else in the pool. In the worst case, they will not find employment at all, yet income can be a
better predictor of health than the health factors that wellness programs seek to improve.” Id.; see also
Jessica Roberts, Healthism and the Law of Employment Discrimination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 571, 607
(2014) (arguing that “employer screens for health could disproportionally harm certain vulnerable
populations, in particular racial and ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, and the poor and nearpoor by simultaneously restricting their access to wage work and to employer-provided benefits.”).
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§ 1115 waivers.120 As just one example, this led in Arkansas to over 18,000
individuals losing their Medicaid coverage in 2018 because they failed to verify
compliance with the state’s work requirement, which the state imposed on some
beneficiaries as an ostensibly “healthy” behavior.121 It is unclear whether these
individuals failed because they had no access to a computer in initial months to
verify compliance, or because they did not know about or understand the
requirement, or had limited opportunities available to them, or could work but
simply did not want to do so. One study, however, found that more than 95% of
the study population subject to the work requirements were either already
meeting them or should have qualified for an exemption, and that nearly 35%
had never even heard of the requirements.122
Health-contingent wellness programs can create similar binds. They take a
more paternalistic approach to personal health by offering benefits to - or
imposing penalties upon - individuals based on their achievement, or lack
thereof, of certain health goals, activities, or biometric indicators.123 One
program, for example, gives employees the option of undergoing an annual
biometric screening through a third-party vendor to measure factors such as body
mass index, blood pressure, cholesterol and tobacco/nicotine use, using an online
risk assessment, and participating in a variety of workplace fitness activities, or
else be subject to a weekly health premium surcharge of $50.124 Such programs
assume a causal connection between individual actions and measured outcomes
and reward or penalize participants based on the results. Employers oftentimes
describe a primary impetus for such programs as reducing health care costs, often

120. See, e.g., Healthy Indiana Plan STCs, supra note 111, at 23-24 (describing penalties, including
disenrollment, for non-payment of POWER account contributions); CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, No. 11-W-00293/5, WISCONSIN BADGERCARE
REFORM, 23 (2018) https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1115/downloads/wi/wi-badgercare-reform-ca.pdf (describing how beneficiaries with a
health risk behavior such as “excessive alcohol consumption, failure to engage in dietary, exercise, and
other lifestyle (or “healthy”) behaviors in attempt to attain or maintain a healthy body weight, illicit drug
use, failure to use a seatbelt, and tobacco use” who fail either to attest that they are actively managing
their behavior or that they have a condition that causes them to engage in that behavior will be charged a
full premium for coverage rather than a reduced one); CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES,
SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, No. 11-W-00275/9, ARIZONA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT
SYSTEM, 27 (2019), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1115/downloads/az/az-hccc-ca.pdf (specifying disenrollment as a penalty for failing to
pay a monthly “premium” to their medical spending account).
121. ARK. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., ARKANSAS WORKS PROGRAM 8 (2018),
https://humanservices.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/011519_AWReport.pdf.
122. Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Medicaid Work Requirements in Arkansas: Tow-Year Impacts on
Coverage, Employment, and Affordability of Care, 39 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1522, 1526, 1527 (2020).
123. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
124. RAND Corporation, Workplace Wellness Programs Study 52-54 (2013),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/researchers/analysis/health-and-welfare/workplacewellness-programs-study-case-studies-summary-report.pdf.
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by incentivizing healthy choices or disincentivizing unhealthy ones.125 Yet, as
Professor Wikler observes, employees may have only limited freedom of choice
in their ability to participate in such programs, depending on a host of
circumstances.126 In cases where better health choices might be “less attractive
than they should have been, morally speaking,” or where they are effectively
unavailable, then the terms on which an individual makes an unhealthy choice
may be unfair in a real, moral sense.127 Such individuals may be penalized not
only in the constraints they may face in making such choices and the adverse
health consequences that may result, but also in the penalties exacted through
certain wellness programs.128
At the same time that governments and employers are reallocating
responsibility for health onto individuals, to the arguable detriment of the most
disadvantaged among them, some of these same governments are making it more
difficult for individuals to make healthy choices about basic conditions of their
existence, such as the water they drink and the air they breathe.129 Before the
government can hold individuals accountable for their own health, it needs to do
its part to ensure the existence of necessary preconditions for living a healthy
life. A person can exercise, eat a reasonable diet, and not smoke or drink, but if
they live in a part of the country where oil refining facilities regularly vent

125. See, e.g., Dee Edington, Workplace Wellness Programs: a Win-Win Strategy, in U.S. CHAMBER
13, 13-15 (2019),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/022436_labr_wellness_report_opt.pdf (discussing the
benefits employers could see in reducing health care costs and providing several examples of several
companies’ experiences).
126. See Wikler, supra note 1, at 99-101 (discussing whether various people truly do have the
freedom to make lifestyle choices that will improve health).
127. Wikler, supra note 1, at 101.
128. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Jim Malewitz & Kiah Collier, To Paxton’s Cheers, Court Blocks EPA Clean Water
Rule, TEXAS TRIBUNE (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/10/09/paxtons-cheers-courtblocks-epa-clean-water-rule/ (reporting a stay of the Obama-era Clean Water Rule in response to a
challenge brought by Ohio, Texas and other states); see also Charles Piller, Exclusive: FDA
Enforcement Actions Plummet Under Trump, SCIENCE MAGAZINE (Jul. 2, 2019),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/07/exclusive-fda-enforcement-actions-plummet-under-trump
(noting that FDA warning letters have fallen by one-third and that warnings from the FDA Center for
Devices and Radiological Health dropped by more than two-thirds); Michael Hawthorne, Under Trump,
the EPA Has Cut Back on Enforcement of Clean Water Laws in the Great Lakes Region, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/environment/ct-trump-epa-great-lakesenforcement-decline-20200421-ddrijfviyrchpa2khe6za5d5m4-story.html (describing the substantial
downturn in EPA enforcement actions under the Trump administration against plants that, for example,
dumped carcinogenic or toxic substances into lakes and rivers); Richard Florida & Claire Tran, Where
Americans Lack Running Water, Mapped, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Aug. 6, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-06/where-americans-lack-running-water-mapped
(describing how “plumbing poverty is clearly linked to race and ethnicity,” and is also associated with
poverty and renter rather than homeowner status); Bill Lindeke, Sidewalks Are Public Health,
STREETS.MN (Apr. 20, 2020), https://streets.mn/2020/04/20/sidewalks-are-public-health/ (discussing the
dangerousness and inadequacy of sidewalks in locations throughout the Twin Cities in Minnesota).
OF COMMERCE, WINNING WITH WELLNESS
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benzene and other pollutants above legal thresholds,130 or where steel mills dump
carcinogenic metals into drinking water sources with relative impunity,131 they
cannot be said to have full and meaningful responsibility for their health. To
blame individuals for bad health outcomes under such circumstances is the
antithesis of personal responsibility, in which individuals choose their own goals
and accept the consequences.132
While individuals are being penalized by making what employers or states
consider to be poor health choices, many industries are largely free to market
unhealthy products that are designed and produced with the specific goal of
maximally enticing their use or consumption by these same people.133 We
subsidize production of corn and soybeans134 – the primary ingredients for many
calorie-laden but low-nutrient, highly-processed foods, among other items – but
not, typically, vegetables and fruit.135 This policy choice has contributed to a
130. See, e.g., Kiah Collier, Report: Six Texas Oil Refineries Spewing Cancer-Causing Pollutant
Above Federal Threshold, TEXAS TRIBUNE (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/02/06/sixtexas-oil-refineries-spewing-cancer-causing-pollutant-benzene/ (reporting that six refineries in Texas
had concentrations of benzene over the legal threshold at their fence lines, including three in the
Houston area).
131. See Hawthorne, supra note 129 (reporting that U.S. Steel “reported another spill of hexavalent
chromium six months later, around the same time public interest lawyers dug up records documenting
scores of other clean water violations at the northwest Indiana steel mill. Yet Trump appointees at the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency declined to punish the company, rebuffing career staff who
confirmed U.S. Steel had repeatedly, and illegally, released harmful pollution into the region’s chief
source of drinking water”).
132. See, e.g., Frank Nullmeier, Personal Responsibility and Its Contradictions in Terms, 3 GERMAN
POL’Y STUDIES 386 (2006) (explaining government actions taken under the assumption it knows better
than its citizens and denies people of personal responsibility). See also Daniel Wikler, Personal and
Social Responsibility for Health, 16 ETHICS AND INT’L AFFAIRS 47, 50 (2002) (highlighting that “[t]he
same freedom that permits us to act on our personal tastes and preferences, pursuant to our individual
goals, plans, and values, reduces the scope of excuses for these choices should they turn out badly. Just
as we expect to be left alone to decide which risks to take, others expect to hold us accountable for the
consequences, and when they do, in this view, justice is served, not denied”).
133. See, e.g., ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN
MEAL, 120-29 (2002) (describing the role of the flavor industry in creating products designed to
maximally appeal to human taste); see also RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 742-47 (1997)
(describing how tobacco industry manipulated nicotine levels and availability in cigarettes).
134. See, e.g., United States Farm Subsidy Information, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP
(2018), https://farm.ewg.org/region.php?fips=00000&progcode=total&yr=2018 (showing that nearly
half of the $18 billion in farm subsidies paid in 2018 subsidized the production of soybeans and corn);
see also Caroline Franke et al., Agricultural Subsidies and the American Obesity Epidemic, 45 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 330 (2013) (showing subsidy allocation in 2010).
135. See, e.g., CRS, The U.S. Trade Situation for Fruit and Vegetable Products 1 (2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34468.pdf (noting that, “[h]istorically, fruit and vegetable crops have not
benefitted from the federal farm support programs traditionally included in the farm bill, compared to
the long-standing support provided to the main program commodities (such as grains, oilseeds, cotton,
sugar, and milk”); see also Franke et al., supra note 134, at 329 (noting that “[f]armers are penalized for
growing ‘specialty crops’ (such as fruits and vegetables) if they have received federal farm payments to
grow other crops. In other words, federal farm subsidies promote unsustainable agriculture while also
failing to reward good stewardship. Further, although farmers may generate higher marketplace revenue
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growing disparity between the comparatively cheap cost of commodity products
and comparatively healthier fresh fruits and vegetables,136 to the arguable
detriment of people’s health.137 States and private developers are relatively free
in some jurisdictions to design communities in ways that ignore or foreclose
reasonable opportunities for residents to exercise, associate easily and
comfortably with one another in person, and enjoy peaceful, green spaces.138 If
we want individuals to avoid indolence, gluttony, and misuse of intoxicating
substances, why do we penalize them for such behaviors, while at the same time
giving largely free rein to industries to promote that behavior? If we actually
cared about the health and well-being of individuals, we would make it easier for
them to buy and make healthy food, live in pleasant, reasonably safe, and welldesigned neighborhoods with plenty of opportunities for recreation, and foster
vibrant communities where curiosity is encouraged and where people have
multiple opportunities to connect and become involved, in an effort to build
strong societies and improve mental health. But, we do not. We instead allow
individuals to be treated as a means of maximizing profit, rather than as ends
unto themselves. One can say that they are used as raw materials in commerce,
and then punished when they behave as they are directed.
This is not surprising, but still unacceptable. It is far easier to put the onus
of health improvement on individuals, particularly impoverished or otherwise
disadvantaged individuals, rather than addressing the underlying social
determinants of health and structural inequalities that precipitate poor health.139
With the current attention paid to prevention, linking health care and coverage to
the state of being healthy seems almost natural. What is more, health care and
coverage are perennially well-positioned to absorb ever-increasing spending
from fresh produce, substantially lower economic security makes growing fruits and vegetables a risky
proposition in an already risky industry”). But see Julian M. Alston et al., Farm Subsidies and Obesity in
the United States: National Evidence and International Comparisons, 33 FOOD POL’Y 470 (2008)
(finding that the farm programs, commodity prices, and the implications of farm policies have negligible
impacts upon consumers dietary patterns and obesity).
136. See, e.g., Franke et al., supra note 134, at 331 (arguing that a “redesign of the subsidy system
[to prioritize sustainable, biodiverse crops], rather than its elimination, is likely to yield more sustainable
changes in the agricultural industry. Such revision could take the form of decoupling income supports
from program-specific crops, and rewards for agricultural diversification”); see also Pablo Monsivais et
al., The Risking Disparity in the Price of Healthful Foods, 35 FOOD POL’Y 514 (2010) (highlighting
growing concerns with nutritional content of the American diet).
137. See, e.g., Franke et al., supra note 134, at 328 (arguing that “American farm policy is
effectively driving the production and propagation of cheap sugars and oils that lead to widespread
weight gain.”).
138. See, e.g., Andrew Chee Keng Lee et al., Value of Urban Green Spaces in Promoting Health
Living and Wellbeing: Prospects for Planning, 8 RISK MGMT. AND HEALTH CARE POL’Y 131 (2015)
(discussing the use of green spaces to combat obesity and mental illness).
139. See, e.g., Simon Szreter, The Population Health Approach in Historical Perspective, AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 421 (2003) (discussing historical perspectives of health systems along with the
“resurgence of the population health approach [which] has developed from dissatisfaction with some of
the limitations of a strongly individual-oriented methodology”).

252

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 23:2

because of their substantial subsidization by government. Health care provides
an easy out for both government and society regarding health improvement. It is
far easier to tell someone to take a pill or have a surgery than it is to either prevent
or ameliorate their health problem by diminishing pollution and encouraging
both exercise and healthier eating through structural changes in society.
The outcome might be different if evidence demonstrated that imposing the
burden of health improvement more heavily on individuals than on structural or
societal elements yielded the best outcomes. If it were more effective and less
expensive to focus efforts on individuals rather than to alter our regulation of
certain industries, then it might be justifiable to require individuals to adhere to
wellness programs or otherwise make efforts to demonstrate their personal
responsibility for health as a condition of accessing benefits or obtaining them
more cheaply.
Unfortunately, no definitive evidence exists to support this. With respect to
wellness programs, existing evidence suggests that such programs yield only
limited, if any, benefits, regardless of whether one examines changes in health
or reductions in overall health care costs.140 Evidence suggests that wellness

140. In the case of wellness requirements, participation rates among employees can be quite
variable. On average, slightly less than half take advantage of a health risk assessment or other health
screening if offered, but participation rates vary substantially from employer to employer. Soren Mattke
et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Study: Final Report 36 (RAND 2013),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR254/RAND_RR254.pdf.
Participation in health-contingent wellness programs is even less. Sixty-five percent of employer’s
report that only 20% or fewer of their employees participate in any health-contingent program. Id. at 37.
That percentage rises to 90% of employers with 20% or less participation in the case of weight or
smoking management programs. Id. In a case study of five large employers (each having between 3,500
and 65,000 employees) that RAND performed in 2009, one employer had participation from a
substantial majority (86%) of its employees, however the other firms only recorded about 25% - 55% of
their employees participating in any wellness program component, whether participatory or healthcontingent. Id. at 40. Adding a weekly $50 premium surcharge appeared to be the primary impetus for
the increased participation at one case study workplace. Id. at 59. Exercise programs had a significant
effect according to the RAND report. Participants added an extra 1.5 days per week during which they
exercised at least 20 minutes per day. Id. at 44. The results were significant in the first and second years
of the study, but not as strong thereafter. Id. Among smokers who participated in a workplace smoking
cessation program, nearly 30% more stopped smoking in the first year than among non-participant
smokers. Id. at 45. The effect continued, though at lesser rates, over time. Id. To put it in perspective, 33
smokers at one of the participating case study employers quit smoking between 2011 and 2012, for a
total reduction in the percentage of smokers at the firm of 1%. Id. at 46. Weight reduction studies had
perhaps the least impact, although it was still statistically significant. The overweight or obese
employees who participated in such a program (11% of such employees, on average, across the five
employers) had a 0.15 point reduction in BMI in the first year of the program and less thereafter. This
translated to less than one pound per woman who stood 5’4” and weighed 165 pounds, and nearly one
pound per man who stood 5’9” and weighed 195 pounds. Id. at 47. While RAND found cost savings
between participants and non-participants, the savings did not reach the level of statistical significance.
Id. at 55-57. That being said, studies have found that employers who offer wellness plans do so
primarily to reduce costs – their own costs. See, e.g., Nat’l Bus. Group on Health, Making Well-Being
Work: Ninth Annual Employer-Sponsored Health and Well-Being Survey 1 (Fidelity Investments 2018),
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programs may, at least in some cases, yield cost savings.141 However, as
suggested earlier, these benefits may largely exist only for healthy employees
participating in health-contingent wellness programs and their employers, and
only because their costs may be shifted in part onto less healthy, often lowerincome employees.142 The evidence for the efficacy of personal responsibility
programs in Medicaid is even more scant. Little evidence exists whether one
considers relatively novel work requirements143 or longer-standing punitive
measures regarding cost sharing, benefit reductions or lockout periods for
failures to meet specific targets.144
Placing an undue onus on individuals to make and keep themselves healthy,
without adequate social and governmental support, is not only ethically unsound
but also has little evidentiary support. It is time to end the current trend toward

https://www.fidelity.com/bin-public/060_www_fidelity_com/documents/press-release/Fidelity-WellBeing-Survey-041819.pdf (describing the incetive employers have to implement well-being programs).
141. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 125, at 14-15 (discussing return on
investment for specific employers).
142. See Jill Horwitz et al., supra note 72, at 474 (explaining that the “review found, at best,
conflicting evidence that people with the conditions typically included in wellness pro-grams spend
more on health care than others and, therefore, offer particularly attractive sources for cost reduction;
respond to financial incentives with behavior changes; and thus improve their health. How can these
findings be reconciled with claims that wellness programs have reduced employers’ costs? … [T]he
evidence makes it quite plausible that employees with health risks are paying more for their care,
subsidizing the healthy employees in the programs.”).
143. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs, Arkansas Works Section 1115 Demonstration Waiver: 2018
Annual Report 7, 12 (2019), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/Health-Care-Independence-Program-Private-Option/ar-works-annlrpt-jan-dec-2018.pdf; Arkansas’s Arkansas Works annual report stated that, out of the 38,321
individuals subject to work requirements who were required to report their work activities, 4,353 failed
to comply for three months and thus were disenrolled from the program. Id. See also Indiana Family &
Soc. Servs. Admin., Learn about Gateway to Work, https://ismanet.org/ISMA/Resources/e-Reports/125-18/HIP_members_will_learn_their_work_requirement_status_by_Dec_10.aspx (explaining that
Indiana has also implemented an approved work requirement; however, it commenced in January2019
and no data is yet available with respect to it).
144. See, e.g., Lewin Group, Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0: Power Account Contribution Assessment 1,
7-8, 10-12 (2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20POWER-acct-cont-assesmnt-03312017.pdf (finding that, of the 590,315 HIP participants eligible to
make a “POWER” account contribution in 2015-2016, and thus to enroll in or remain enrolled in HIP
Plus, 55% failed to do so during that time period, resulting in their demotion to HIP Basic, their
disenrollment, or their non-enrollment. The total included nearly 30% of those who earned 100% or
more of the federal poverty level, and thus who could be either disenrolled or never enrolled in HIP as a
result of failure to pay into their POWER account). Indiana paused implementation of its 6-month
lockout policy in October, 2018. CMS, Medicaid Section 1115 Monitoring Report Indiana –Healthy
Indiana PlanDY4 Annual Report 5 (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIPProgram-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthyindiana-plan-support-20-annl-rpt-dy4-20190411.pdf. There were “no discernable patterns” in emergency
department use between HIP beneficiaries who were directed to pay a higher copayment ($25 versus $8)
for non-emergent use of the emergency department, and those who were charged a flat fee ($8) for any
ED use. Lewin Group, at 32.
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imposing personal responsibility requirements on individuals, and instead to
share more broadly the burdens of creating healthy communities.
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